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1. Introduction
Monopoly can be dened as the case when a specic individual or an
enterprise has su¢ cient control over a product or a service to determine the
terms on which the demanders have access on it. Thus monopolies have lack
of competition which is ine¢ cient for the economy. The only one that is
happy from the monopoly is the monopolist himself. Monopolist has all the
control over the product and competition will make him lose some of the
control by losing some of the market share of the product. After now this
initial monopolist rm will be called as Monopolist even if there is compe-
tition. First thing we want to follow is the changes obtained for the initial
rm, so we will call the rm Monopolist to remind that this rm was the
monopolist at the beginning.
Introducing an other rm to a monopoly, will force the Monopolist to be
more careful. It is known that in the case of monopoly the prices fall and
some of the prot of Monopolist will y to the other rm, which are not
desired changes for the Monopolist. But the increase in competition forces
theMonopolist to run more e¢ ciently. Then there might be a case where the
marginal costs decrease and the initial case Monopolist start to make more
prot than before. Addition to that because of the competition the demand
may increase and theMonopolist may make higher prots. Monopolist being
the only rm in the market has no incentive to decrease the costs and also it
is hard to dene whether you are, as a monopolist, doing good or bad. There
is no other rm to benchmark. So, at the end of the day, as the new rm
is introduced to the market, the Monopolist has the opportunity to compare
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its employees with the other rmsemployees depending on the performance
of the rm. Now the Monopolist has to be more motivated and has to spend
more e¤ort not to loose its share in the market. Near that as there is an
increase in the motivation of the other rm, the Monopolist has to be even
more motivated.
This motivation based intuition is valid for all kinds of economies, since
motivation is needed always. But there are some markets that motivation
is directly related with the performance or the e¢ ciency of the companies.
To make our point clearer now lets consider the football market. Since the
teams are directly e¤ected from the performance of the other teams, others
motivation is almost as important as our own motivation. In a normal goods
market you could call yourself an e¢ cient company even if you are not run-
ning e¢ ciently and in this case you may not care about the motivation of
other rms. Because, lets say, the market is too big and you get enough
prot without being e¢ cient. But for football sector you need to take the
other motivations into account.
Although we are not aiming to construct a model for the football sector
only, let us give an example in this sector to make the idea clear. Bayern
Munich is one of the biggest football teams in the world. The February 2009
Deloitte research shows that when the quality and the price of the players,
number of audiences, the budget of the teams and revenues are considered
Bayern is at top 5 (Football Money League,2009) teams of the world. In this
research it is also given that German League is one of the biggest leagues in
the world with English, Spanish and Italian Leagues. Bayern as being the
strongest team of Germany on the basis of revenue, budget and player quality,
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has been successful in Bundesliga (German League) about 15 times in the last
20 years. So Bayern Munich is behaving like a monopolist in German League
market. It is dominating the market. But when it is compared to the big
teams of English, Spanish and Italian leagues it is not successful at all. We
can compare these teams using the results they have from the international
Champions League, where the biggest teams of Europe compete. In Italian,
English or Spanish leagues there exists at least two teams that are highly
qualied and rich and that are competing. Even for some leagues there are
four or ve teams that are closely strong and that compete every year in their
own league and Champions League. So those teams that are competing in
English, Italian and Spanish leagues have the opportunity to learn from other
teams and they always have to be motivated and e¢ cient to be successful.
Where as for Bayern Munich, they do not have to be very motivated to be
champion in their league, because they already have much more qualied
players than other German teams. This lack of motivation prevents Bayern
Munich to be successful when they compete in a better league, here given as
the Champions League. So teams are not using only their own motivation,
but otherss motivation is also very important.
There are many studies in regulations literature about how motivation
can decrease the costs to make the company run more e¢ ciently. La¤ont
and Tiroles 1986 paper construct their study on a model as follows: C =
(   e) + $:C is total cost,  is marginal cost and e is the given e¤ort
level where we call it motivation in this study. What we are assuming here
is more than that. Of course if a company becomes more motivated to
eliminate some processes in order to be more e¢ cient, then their cost will
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decrease. But we also assume that there is a spillover between the motivation
of competing rms. That is if there was an other big team competing with
Bayern, then Bayern would rstly increase its own motivation meaning e1,
and addition to that Bayern would learn from also from other teamstraining
tactics. So other rms e¤ort (e2) will directly decrease Bayerns cost too.
So adding this to La¤ont and Trioles paper, our cost function could be given
as C1 = (1   (e1 + e2) +$: Here  is the parameter showing the level of
spillover.
This intuition has some common sense with the yardstick competition.
Since there is not many studies assuming spillover of motivations between
the rms, we can try to explain it using yardstick competition literature.
But still in yardstick competition rms are not in the same market and they
are not directly competing, where in our case they are in the same market
and competing for the same good. Yardstick competition is mainly about
the franchised monopolies and the regulation process of this monopolies. The
main concern of this kind of regulation is the cost-of-service. The regulator
adjusts the prices of the monopolist depending on the cost it incurs. If the
prices follow the costs then the monopolist has no incentive to minimize the
costs. And as the regulator is not likely to know the e¢ cient cost level, can
not decide whether the monopolist is running e¢ ciently. Schmalensee o¤ers
a kind of yardstick benchmarking to solve this problem (1979). He o¤ers a
state-owned rm engaged to the same business line as the regulated rm. But
Schleifer oppose that by stating that state-owned rms are too di¤erent than
the private rms and plus they are not running e¢ ciently most of the time,
so they can not be useful benchmarks. Shleifer suggests comparing similar
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regulated rms with each other that are operating in independent markets
(1985). This approach gets closer to our case by comparing two private
rms, but still the only common thing between this paper and the regulation
literature is the intuition of cost decreasing between the rms. Because we
dont have a mechanism like regulation at all. Using the Shleifers logic
Armstrong et al. denes the prices in a regulated market as follows in his
book (1994):
P (ci; cj) = p+ 1ci + 2cj
where 0s are the dependence rate of the prices to the costs of the rms.
This model suggests that if cost of one rm decreases, then the regulator
decrease the price and the other rm has to decrease its cost too. So if
the benchmark rm spend more e¤ort to decrease its costs, the regulator
could even decrease the prices in a way that our rm can start to make loss.
Hence it has to spend some e¤ort too. That is: ones e¤ort (motivation) will
increase others e¤ort at the same time.
An other formal literature that was useful during the study was Petit and
Randaccios study about the technological innovations (2000). They search
how investment on R&D inuences the form of the foreign expansion or vice
versa. The main, generally known, assumption they made was the spillover
of the R&D investments. They assume the process innovation investments
are cost reducing and in a two rm country, rmsmarginal costs are e¤ected
from computing rmss investments in R&D. They try to nd the way of for-
eign expansion (exporter or MNE-multinational rm) under this assumption.
Similar studies has been made by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1998) for a
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closed economy where they analyze the R&D investment process in a coun-
try with the assumption of innovation spillover. We use the intuition of the
yardstick competition and the spillover e¤ect of the innovations to answer
the given question, except we now assume that motivation is the element
that decrease the marginal costs and there is a spillover of the motivation
among companies.
What distinguishes our study from previous literature is that we take the
idea of yardstick competition with the decreasing marginal costs and ask a
completely di¤erent question: what happens to the prot of the monopolist
when competition is introduced to the market under the assumption of de-
creasing marginal costs with motivation. Kenneth J. Arrow also compares
monopoly with competition, concluding that incentive to invest is higher un-
der competition than monopoly (1969). But he leans his study on royalties
that are used by the inventor company for the inventions, which is totally
di¤erent than our case.
We present a two country, two rm model for mainly two di¤erent cases
and then we analyze two extension cases. In the rst case we analyze a
monopolist running in a closed economy. Then we add an other rm to this
market to see the changes in motivations of the monopolist, quantity sold
and nally the prots. In the second case we consider an open economy
where the rms can sell their products abroad. Again, for this case we rst
assume an individual monopolist rm and then we add an other rm to
realize competition. Later we try to see what happens when we increase
competition by increasing the number of rms. We rst analyze comparison
of two, three and four rms cases, then we make an other assumption, that
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is what if increasing number of rms in the market decrease the power of the
rms and they start to lose their ability to be more motivated. The equations
for the models are kept as simple as possible in order to be able to obtain
analytical results and analyze them.
There are mainly three di¤erent forces ghting when we introduce com-
petition to a market. A new entrant decreases the market share of the rms
that are already in the market. But on the other side the new entrant will
increase the motivation of older rms and now they have the opportunity
to utilize competition. After a point because of the free riding e¤ect, the
spillover of motivations may become bad for the companies and they may
want to decrease their motivations. So for the competition to be better for
older rms, the positive e¤ect of competition (increased motivation and moti-
vational spillover) should be higher than the negative e¤ect of free riding and
market share loss. We prove that under certain amount of spillover competi-
tion prots for the rms are higher than the monopolists prot both for the
open and the closed economy. The same result is valid for motivations and
quantities that is when competition is introduced the motivation levels in-
crease for the rms and interestingly this increase in motivation decrease the
prices more than anticipated (more than a normal decrease caused by com-
petition without any motivational structure). An other result we obtained
is, for the open market the increase of prot when we move from monopoly
to competition is higher than the closed economy case. Since the number of
markets increase, the potential prot for the monopolist also increases in an
open economy, and hence the Monopolist has more opportunity to utilize
in the case of competition. We have also found that under this motivational
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structure more competition can make the market worse o¤, and if we try to
decrease the free riding e¤ect then more rms in the market starts to mean
more welfare for the economy.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the model will be described
with the analysis of the results. We will compare the cases of monopoly and
duopoly for both closed and open economies. Then we will analyze the
changes for the rms and customers with the case of new entrants to the
market which means more competition and nally section 3 will conclude
the paper.
2. The Model
The constructed model considers two markets (home and abroad)
and two rms (rm 1, rm 2) which manufacture the same homogenous
good in home and abroad. We consider that motivation (m) is e¤ective on
the optimal quantity levels of the rms chosen. Petit and Randaccios model
about export and FDI assume investments as a cost decreasing element.
same wise, introduced motivation reduces the marginal and average costs. A
prot function very similar to Shleifer (1985) will be used with some changes.
The prices will be assigned using Cournots equilibrium as used by Petit
and Randaccio or dAspremont and Jacquemin. The prot function can be
dened as follows:
i = (p Ci)qi(p) R(mi) (1)
The cost function with yard stick competition intuition is given as follows
:
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Ci(mi;mj) = ci (mi+mj) i; j = 1; 2 (2)
Where c1 and c2 are marginal costs for rm 1 and rm 2. m1;m2 are
the motivation levels for the companies. The value of c can di¤er depending
on rms, so c can be seen as past accumulated knowledge (Petit, Randaccio,
1997) where if the rm is more experienced c will be smaller, but for simplicity
we will assume c1 = c2. The e¤ectivity of the motivations on the costs
changes depending on the motivation e¤ectivity parameter, : The spill over
parameter for the costs or the motivations between the rms is : Hence as
the spillover parameter increase, a decrease in the cost of rm 2 decrease the
cost of the rm 1 more. Each rm has a constant marginal cost c and can
reduce the cost to c  m; by spending R(m) that is the cost of motivation.
R(m) will be as   m2
2
in our model. We assume @R
@m
> 0 and @
2R
@m2
> 0.
That is the cost function is an increasing, convex function; reducing costs by
increasing motivation becomes more and more costly.
If we substitute eq. (2) into eq. (1) and rewrite it, we will obtain:
i = pqi(p)  ciqi(p) + (mi + mj)qi(p) R(mi)
As you see this time the motivations are included with a positive coef-
cient. With this construction the cost decreasing motivation approach is
very similar to prot increasing advertisement approach. Now ms can be
seen as the investments for advertisement. Even if we are competing, if the
other rm makes advertisement the market increases and my prot increases
too. Also if the other rm makes investments for advertisement, it also forces
me to make investment too, because of the competition. That increases my
own m:
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We are going to use Cournot Equilibrium to nd the optimal levels of
motivation and quantities. The linear inverse demand functions are consid-
ered as:
ph = ah   bh  qh and pf = af   bf  qf (3)
qh, qf are the total amount of goods sold at home and foreign country,
respectively. For the sake of simplicity, ah = af and bh = bf is assumed
where a and bs are positive constants, as we know from Cournots model 1
b
represents the size of the market. The main assumptions for the model can
be represented as follows:
1. c

1 mi + mj; i; j = 1; 2
2. a
b
1 qi 1 0, i = h, f
3. a > ci + cj > 0; i; j = 1; 2
First two conditions satisfy the prices and the costs to be greater than
zero. Third condition is the initiality condition: for q = 0;m = 0; p >
C(c1; c2). This condition makes sure that the rms will be active.
Firstly we will analyze a monopoly and then a competitive market in a
closed economy. Then same analysis will be made for an open economy.
2.1 Closed Economy
2.1.1 Closed economy-Monopoly
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The rm is a monopolist in the market, has no exporting activity. The
prot of the company is given by:
 = (p  (c  m))q(p) R(m) or
 = ((a  b  q)  (c  m))  q     m2
2
(4)
where   m2
2
is the cost of motivation.  is a positive constant, showing
the cost e¢ ciency of the rm. The quadratic form says that there exist a pos-
sibility of diminishing returns to motivation (Cheng, 1984). Here, since the
market is a monopoly; there is no other rm and no spillover of motivation.
2.1.2 Closed economy-Duopoly
Now an other company is introduced to the market with similar proper-
ties. We allow for motivational spillover. We assume that increase in ones
motivation increase the others motivation too, hence directly and indirectly
decrease the others marginal cost. Now the marginal cost function becomes:
Ci(c1; c2) = c  (mi + mj) (5)
 is the spillover parameter. The new inverse demand function becomes:
p = a  b  (q1 + q2) (6)
so the prots for the two rms are as follows:
1 = ((a  b  (q1 + q2))  (c  (m1 + m2)))  q1     m
2
1
2
(7)
2 = ((a  b  (q1 + q2))  (c  (m2 + m1)))  q2     m
2
2
2
(8)
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2.1.3 Impact of competition on Monopolist
Closed economy-Monopoly
It is known that introducing competition to the market will take many ad-
vantages from the monopolist, but on the other side; because of the spillover
e¤ect, the e¢ ciency of the initial rm (Monopolist) will increase with the
decrease in marginal costs. So it is a trade o¤ between market share and
marginal costs. For the monopoly market case, from the rst order condi-
tions we get:
q = 1
2
 (a c+m))
b
(9)
The positive relationship between optimal level of quantity sold and mo-
tivation can be easily seen. Decreasing marginal costs induce an increase in
quantity sold. Substituting (9) into (4) and maximizing over m gives the
following level of quantity and motivation:
m = (a c) 2+2b (10)
q = (a c) 2+2b (11)
Assuming that second order condition (2b   2 > 0 ) is satised1, as
expected the motivation and the quantity increase with higher demand and
decrease with marginal cost. Given @m=@ > 0 and @q=@ > 0; as produc-
tivity of motivation () increase , again, rms become more motivated and
sell more. Using equations (10) and (11), the equations for price and prot
are given as follows:
1See assumption 3 for a  c > 0
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 = 1
2
 (a c)2 2+2b and p = a  b 2(a c) 2+2b (12)
Closed economy-Duopoly
Now we assume that an other company enters to the market. Because of
competition, this company will take some of the market share of the previous
one, but the marginal costs will decrease, hence we need to search for the nal
e¤ect of the competition. Each rm tries to maximize its prot by choosing
their optimal level of output under Cournot assumptions. We assume that
the game is played in sequential manner; rst the quantities are found and
then the motivations. We obtain:
q1 =
1
3
 a c+(m1(2 )+m2(2 1))
b
(13)
q2 =
1
3
 a c+(m2(2 )+m1(2 1))
b
(14)
It is clear that rms own motivation increase the quantity sold, but the
e¤ect of other rms motivation depends on the spillover parameter. The
e¤ect is positive if  > 0:5. If the spill over between the rms is not high
enough ( < 0:5) the e¤ect is negative. An increase in the motivation of
rm 2 has two opposing e¤ects on the output of rm 1. On one hand an
increase in m2 will reduce the marginal cost of rm 2 and this will have a
negative e¤ect on q1: On the other hand, an increase in m2 will also reduce
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the marginal cost of rm 1 and this will have a positive e¤ect on q1: The last
one is the spillover e¤ect. So the net a¤ect depends on value of :
Substituting (13), (14) into the prot functions and maximizing for m1;
m2 we get:
m1 = m2 =
2(2 )(a c)
9b 22+222 42 (15)
yielding:
q1 = q2 =
3(a c)
9b 22+222 42 (16)
Price and prot of Monopolist :
p = a  6b(a c)
9b 22+222 42 (17)
 = (a c)
2(9b 222+82 82)
(9b 22+222 42)2 (18)
Again, the motivation and sales amounts are positively related with the
knowledge accumulation of the companies (decrease in c), the demand (in-
crease in a), motivation cost e¤ectivity ( 1

)2, productivity of motivations ()3
and the market size (1
b
). Given that 2b  2 > 0; then 9b  22+222 
42 > 04 Hence solution for m; q and p are positive in this case as well. Now
the important question is, how does the competition e¤ect the optimal level
of motivation and quantity? When equations (10) and (15) are compared;
2@m=@ < 0 and @q=@ < 0
3@m=@ > 0 and @q=@ > 0
4See Appendix A.1 for the proof
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Figure 1: Change in Motivation
for the competition case motivation to be higher, equation 10
equation 15
< 1 should hold.
Depending on this inequality we found that, given 1 >  > 0; the  values
satisfying 2
2(2 2)
1+4
> b will certainly say that motivation under competi-
tion is higher than motivation under monopoly 5. The motivation e¢ ciency
is constant and  takes values between 1 and 0. The behavior of the function
2(2 2)
1+4
is depicted in Figure 1.
The given inequality is pretty intuitive actually, it says if the e¢ ciency of
motivation increases () the possibility of motivation under competition to
be higher than motivation under monopoly increases, or if the market gets
smaller (b gets higher) or the motivation cost e¢ ciency is smaller ( higher-
motivation is costly) then the possibility of motivation under monopoly being
higher than motivation under competition increases. Looking at the graph,
5See Appendix A.2 for the proof
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the left hand-side of the inequality gets higher for the values of  that are close
to 0:5, hence when  is around 0:5 the possibility of competition becoming
more attractive than the monopoly, gets higher; that is if the spillover e¤ect
is too small the advantages of competition is not utilized well or the cost
decreasing e¤ect of competition is not utilized enough to compensate the
market share loss. Similarly when spillover is too much, other rm utilize
the monopolist motivation a lot and hence, because of the free riding e¤ect
competition becomes worse than monopoly for theMonopolist. As we can see
from the graph as  > 0:5; the value of the function decreases slowly where
when  < 0:5 the function decreases faster, that is because after 0:5 there are
two opposing e¤ects: because of the free riding e¤ect the motivation tends
to decrease, but on the other side increasing motivation makes the market
larger by decreasing the costs and hence this e¤ect makes the decrease of the
function to be slower. Similar analysis can be made for the optimal quantities
(see eq. (11) and (16)). we obtain that quantity for competition is higher
than the quantity for monopoly if 
2
3
(1 + 2   22) > b: Same intuition,
achieved for motivation, is also valid for optimal quantities.To see how graph
of the function 1+2 2
2
3
behaves see Figure 2.
Analysis about the prots will give us the nal decision whether compe-
tition is better for the monopolist or not and for what level of spillover it is
better. The prot level for the duopoly is given by
eq. 18. As we can see, @=@ > 0; as  increase prot of the Monopolist
in the competition increases too. So higher the level of spillover better it is
for the monopolist. Comparison of eq. 18 with eq. 12 will yield the following
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Figure 2: Change in Quantities
results:
for  = 0;
2 1 = (a c)2(9b 2
22+82 82)
(9b 22+222 42)2   (a c)
2
 22+4b =
(a c)2(9b 82)
(9b 42)2   (a c)
2
4b 22 <
0
 = 0:5;
2   1 = (a c)2(9b 2
22+82 82)
(9b 22+222 42)2   (a c)
2
 22+4b =
(a c)2
9b 4:52   (a c)
2
4b 22 < 0
 = 1;
2   1 = (a c)2(9b 2
22+82 82)
(9b 22+222 42)2   (a c)
2
 22+4b =
(a c)2(9b 22)
(9b 42)2   (a c)
2
4b 22
It is seen that for  = 0:5, the prot of a rm under monopoly structure
is higher than a duopoly market structure. But for  = 0:1; prot of a rm
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under duopoly structure is higher than the that under monopoly structure
higher if 452b2 < 46b2   124:
If the motivation cost e¢ ciency or the motivation e¢ ciency is high for the
monopolist, or if the market is large enough then for high level of spillover,
competition becomes better for the Monopolist.
2.2 Open economy
Now the rms both compete at home and abroad. At part 2.1, we have
seen that the motivation and quantity level is positively related for each rm.
That is, if the rm can produce more the opportunity to make prot gets
higher, hence the rm becomes more motivated. Near that if the rm can
increase the motivation, then the costs become smaller and producing more
becomes more protable. So more motivation means more production or
sales, and more production means more motivated company. At this part
another market is added to the model. Now the rm has the opportunity
to make more prot by producing more. This opportunity makes the rm
to be more motivated and rm starts to produce even more. Given that
the motivation increase obtained because of the foreign market will also be
e¤ective for the home market, an interesting analysis can be made, at that
part, by analyzing the e¤ect of foreign market in the home market. For
simplicity we assume that there is no foreign competitor.
2.2.1 Open economy-Monopoly
First, we will consider the case where there is only one rm selling goods
at home and abroad. Inverse demand function at home and abroad will be
18
as follows:
ph = (a bqh) and pf = (a bqf ) (19)
where qh and qf are the quantities sold. The prot function of the mo-
nopolist will be as follows:
 = ((a   b  qh)   (c    m))  qh + ((a   b  qf )   (c    m))  qf    
m2
2
(20)
We assume that the exported goods are produced in the same company
and exporting goods is not costly. The monopolist has to choose the optimal
values for home and abroad market to maximize the prot. We assume that
the demand functions are same for both of the markets.
2.2.2 Open economy-Duopoly
At that point another company enters the market which will be also active
at foreign market. Because of the competition the prices will fall, but the
competition will also induce e¢ ciency and the marginal costs will be lower
too. Inverse demand function are given as:
ph = (a b(q1;h+q2;h)) and pf = (a b(q1;f+q2;f )) (21)
Given the prices the prot function for the rms are:
1 = ((a  b  (q1;h + q2;h))  (c    (m1 + m2)))  q1;h + ((a  b  (q1;f +
q2;f ))  (c    (m1 + m2)))  q1;f     m
2
1
2
(22)
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2 = ((a  b  (q1;h+ q2;h))  (c    (m1+ m2)))  q2;h+ ((a  b  (q1;f +
q2;f ))  (c    (m1 +  m2)))  q2;f     m
2
2
2
(23)
First rm has to choose q1;h and q1;f by considering the move that rm 2
will make, same thing is also true for rm 2. So the obtained quantities will
be the prot maximizing Nash equilibrium values.
2.1.3 Impact of competition on prots
Analysis of this part is more important, because now we will be able to an-
alyze two di¤erent relations:
1) Does the protability of moving from monopoly to duopoly change
when the Monopolist is exporting?
2) For an exporting monopoly market, how does introduced competition
e¤ect optimal quantity, motivation and prot levels (at home and abroad)?
Open economy-Monopoly
We start by maximizing the prot with choosing sales at home and abroad
under Cournot assumptions. The maximizing quantities are obtained as:
qf = qh =
1
2
(a c+m)
b
(23)
using the given sales the optimal level of motivation is given by:
m = (a c) 2+b (24)
when compared to the non-exporting monopolist case (equation (10) ) it
can be seen that motivation is higher for the exporting monopolist. We now
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that motivation is directly related with the quantity sold, hence if the rm
opportunity to sell at new markets then it become more motivated.
Using the optimal motivation level, the quantities are given as:
qf = qh =
1
2
(a c)
 2+b (25)
We now assume that  2+b > 0. qh values are higher than the q values
where q values for denoting the amount sold by the non-exporting monop-
olist. Introducing a new market increases the quantity produced, that was
expected, but a new market increase the opportunity to make prot which
increases the motivation and motivation makes the process more e¢ cient by
decreasing the marginal costs. Hence producing more becomes more prof-
itable. Finally, excluding the sales made outside, rm starts to sell inside
more than the non-exporting case, which is an interesting result.
Exporting rms are more motivated than the non-exporting ones, hence
competition is more protable for the exporting rms than non-exporting ones
(See eq. (33)).
Respectively the price and the prot (total prot of the rm) can be
obtained:
ph = a  12 b(a c) 2+b (26)
 = 1
2
 (a c)2 2+b (27)
Since the quantity sold at home increases when the monopolist start to
export, then the prices expected to decrease more than non-exporting case
which can also be seen by comparing price equations for exporting and non-
exporting monopolies (equations (11) and (26)).
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Open economy-Duopoly
Again, rms start with choosing their quantities of sales at home and
abroad to maximize the prots under Cournot assumptions. We obtain:
q1;h = q1;f =
1
3
a c+(m1(2 )+m2(2 1))
b
(28)
and
q2;h = q2;f =
1
3
a c+(m2(2 )+m1(2 1))
b
(29)
The relationship between the sales and motivation can be seen from equa-
tions (28) and (29). The motivation of each rm e¤ects its own sales posi-
tively. But the e¤ect of other rms motivations is uncertain depending on
value of : if  > 0:5 the e¤ect is positive on the other rm and if  < 0:5 it is
negative. If rm 1 start to increase its motivation, the competitiveness of this
rm increases because of the decrease in its marginal cost which negatively
a¤ect the sales decision of rm 2. But after a point if the spillover is too
much, the free rider e¤ect becomes stronger and this also cause a marginal
cost decrease for rm 2, hence it leaves a positive e¤ect on rm 2, so same
results as the non-exporting case hold here too.
Substituting equations (28) and (29) into the prot functions, we can now
obtain Nash equilibrium strategies for m1 and m2:
m1 = m2 =
4(2 )(a c)
9b 42+422 82 (30)
A positive equilibrium solution exists if 9b   42 + 422   82 > 0.
Given b 2 > 0, it can be easily proven that a positive solution exists6. All
6See Appendix B.1 for proof
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the results we have found in the closed economy-duopoly case are relevant at
that point too, about the e¤ect of cost e¢ ciency, market largeness and etc.
Comparison of eq. (15) and (30) also conrms that exporting rms are more
motivated than the non-exporting ones, hence we can conclude; an exporting
opportunity increase motivation and hence increase e¢ ciency.
The nal equilibrium output quantities are obtained as follows:
q1;h = q1;f = q2;h = q2;f =
3(a c)
9b 42+422 82 (31)
Applying the same analysis we did for the closed economy; competition
motivation is higher than the optimal monopoly motivation for the  values
satisfying
42 (2 
2)
1+4
> b (see eq. (25) and (31)) (32)
At that part we will make two di¤erent comparisons. First what is the
di¤erence between introducing competition to a closed and open economy.
Second how the level of motivation, quantities and prots change by moving
from open economy monopoly to open economy duopoly. When we compare
eq. (32) with the similar inequality for the closed economy (42 (2 
2)
1+4
>
22 (2 
2)
1+4
), we see that the motivation increase obtained when we move from
monopoly to duopoly under open economy is higher than the motivation
increase obtained when we move from monopoly to duopoly under closed
economy. Comparing eq. (25) and (31), similarly if 
2
6
(4  42+1) > b
then optimal quantities for duopoly case is higher than the monopoly case.
The equilibrium prices and prots (total prot of theMonopolist) become:
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ph = pf = a  6b(a c)9b 42+422 82 (33)
 = 2(a c)
2(9b 422+162 162)
(9b 42+422 82)2 (34)
Similar to the closed economy case we see that as  gets higher, the
prot for the competition increases. But when we compare this open econ-
omy duopoly case prot of the Monopolist with the closed economy duopoly
case prot of the Monopolist, it is seen that when the market size doubles
(where rms also enter to the foreign market), the prots increase more then
two times. The opportunity of selling more also increases the motivations of
the each rm. That also increases the other rms motivation and the decrease
in the marginal costs take place more then expected which makes increasing
the production even more protable. Comparing the prots for open econ-
omy will yield the following di¤erence between the prots of Monopolist for
monopoly and duopoly:
 = 0;
2   1 = 2(a c)2(9b 4
22+162 162)
(9b 42+422 82)2   (a c)
2
 22+2b =
2(a c)2(9b 162)
(9b 82)2  
(a c)2
2b 22 < 0
 = 0:5;
2 1 = 2(a c)2(9b 4
22+162 162)
(9b 42+422 82)2   (a c)
2
 22+2b =
2(a c)2
9b 92   (a c)
2
 22+2b < 0
 = 1;
2   1 = 2(a c)2(9b 4
22+162 162)
(9b 42+422 82)2   (a c)
2
 22+2b =
2(a c)2(9b 42)
(9b 82)2  
(a c)2
 22+2b
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We can see that for  = 0:5, the Monopolists prot under monopoly
is higher than the Monopolists prot under duopoly. But for  = 1; Mo-
nopolists prot under duopoly is higher than the Monopolists prot under
monopoly if 452b2 < 92b2 484:If the motivation cost e¢ ciency ( 1

) or the
motivation e¢ ciency () is high enough (which is true for highly motivation
dependent markets) then for high level of spillover ( > 0:5), competition
becomes better for the Monopolist. Both for the closed and open economy
we see that as the spillover is not high enough ( < 0:5), the prot of the
Monopolist under monopoly is higher than the prot of the Monopolist un-
der Duopoly. High spillover is not good for the customers because of the
excess free riding e¤ect (rms decide to be less motivated and produce less
which increases the prices). But duopoly becomes better for the rms if the
spillover is high, because high spillover decrease their own motivation and
hence their motivational cost, but still they utilize others motivation and
they become better o¤with high level of spillover. So what rms want is high
spillover and highly motivated competitors where their own motivation can
be low. Comparing the closed and open economies again, we see that under
open economy the prot di¤erence of the Monopolist for the monopoly and
duopoly cases is higher than closed economy prot di¤erence of the Monop-
olist for the monopoly and duopoly cases. So even if under closed economy
it is not protable for the Monopolist to move from monopoly to duopoly
for, lets say,  = 0:7; for the same  it can be protable for the Monopolist
to move from monopoly to duopoly under open economy. This can be easily
seen from given conditions for the prots to be higher for duopoly. The con-
dition for the closed economyMonopolists prot to be higher for the duopoly
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case was 452b2 < 46b2   124: The competition is more protable for the
Monopolist when the rms are exporters since 92b2 484 > 46b2 124:
2.3 Oligopoly (2,3,4 rms)
The next thing to consider is the depth of the competition. Depending
on the spillover parameter there exists a level of competition already, now we
ask the question, what happens if the level of the competition is increased
in the market with increased number of rms. This may lead to various
results, for example the optimal value of alpha for the rms, which is 1, may
decrease because of two much competition. To see how number of rms in
the market e¤ect the motivation level and hence the welfare of the economy,
we will analyze the cases where the market has three and four competitive
rms. For simplicity we will make the analysis for a closed economy. The
calculation for three rm case is made below. Since the analysis for four rm
case is the same only the results has been given for this case.
Similar to the previous cases, the prot functions will be given as follows
for three di¤erent rms.
1 = ((a   b  (q1 + q2 + q3))   (c   (m1 + m2 + m3)))  q1    
m21
2
(35)
2 = ((a   b  (q1 + q2 + q3))   (c   (m2 + m1 + m3)))  q2    
m22
2
(36)
3 = ((a   b  (q1 + q2 + q3))   (c   (m3 + m1 + m2)))  q3    
m23
2
(37)
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Solving the equation for quantities will give us the following equations.:
q1 =
1
4
a c+(m1(3 2)+m2(2 1)+m3(2 1))
b
(38)
q2 =
1
4
 a c+(m2(3 2)+m1(2 1)+m3(2 1))
b
(39)
q3 =
1
4
 a c+(m3(3 2)+m2(2 1)+m1(2 1))
b
(40)
First interesting result is the following; when  < 0:5; where the motiva-
tion of the other rms e¤ect the Monopolists motivation positively, as the
number of rms increase in the market, the quantity level of the Monopolist
becomes more and more dependent to its own motivation. The dependence
of quantities to the motivations is given with the coe¢ cient of motivations.
For example from eq. (38), it is seen that the dependence of rm 1s quan-
tity to its own motivation is (3 2)
4
. This dependence for two rm case was
(2 )
3
(see eq. (13)) and the dependence of Monopolists quantity to its own
motivation for four rm case is (4 3)
5
:When the spillover is not high enough
and the number of rms is high in the market, the risk of losing the mar-
ket increases and the Monopolist feels to be more motivated to deal with
it. When spillover is large enough ( > 0:5), the Monopolists motivation is
utilized by the other rms even more then the duopoly case which decrease
the incentive of the Monopolist to be motivated, plus now the Monopolist
can also utilize the third rms motivation addition to the second one so its
motivation can be less than the two rm case. This is summarize at Figure
3. We have seen that to have the best solution for the customers, there need
to be many rms with low level of spillover. This structure decrease the
free riding, makes all the rms to be motivated and this gives the maximum
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Figure 3: Dependence of Quantities on Motivations
amount of production and minimum amount of price level. What rms want
is high level of spillover, so that they can utilize othersmotivation and dont
have to be dependent to their own motivation which decreases the cost of
motivation.
The motivation and the quantity values can be found as follows:
m1 = m2 = m3 =
(3 2)(a c)
8b 42+422 32 (41)
q1 = q2 = q3 =
2(a c)
8b 42+422 32 (42)
When the quantities for the three rm case and the four rm case com-
pared with the two rm case, it seems that the rms become less motivated.
Now each new entering rm gets a big share of the market and causes big
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Figure 4: change in Motivations
loses to the Monopolist and adds some positive spillover e¤ect. Now the mo-
tivation of the Monopolist will be utilized with more rms which increases
the free riding e¤ect. Market share loss with new entrant and increasing
free riding e¤ect repress the positive spillover e¤ect and hence new entrants
decrease the motivation. But as more and more rms are introduced we will
see the motivation loss becomes less, that is after duopoly introducing an
other rm decreases the motivation a lot, but then introducing an other one
decreases the motivation less. This is because each new entrant cause less
market share loss. This is summarized at Figure 4.
Figure 5 also shows that the changes in the quantities are similar to the
changes in motivations. Less motivation means less willingness to produce,
so as new rm enter to the market Monopolists motivation decrease because
negative e¤ect of market share loss and free riding e¤ect is more than the
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positive e¤ect of marginal cost decrease obtained by using the new entrants
motivation (spillover).
Price and prot for three rm case can be obtained as follows:
p = a  6b(a c)
8b 42+422 32 (43)
 = 1
2
(a c)2(8b 422+122 92)
(8b 42+422 32)2 (44)
The prot di¤erence for the Monopolist between three rm case and
monopoly case is given below:
for  = 0;
2   1 = 12 (a c)
2(8b 422+122 92)
(8b 42+422 32)2   (a c)
2
 22+4b =
1
2
(a c)2(8b 92)
(8b 32)2  
(a c)2
4b 22 < 0
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 = 0:5;
2 1 = 12 (a c)
2(8b 422+122 92)
(8b 42+422 32)2   (a c)
2
 22+4b =
1
2
(a c)2
8b 42   (a c)
2
4b 22 < 0
 = 1;
2 1 = 12 (a c)
2(8b 422+122 92)
(8b 42+422 32)2   (a c)
2
 22+4b =
1
2
(a c)2(8b 2)
(8b 32)2   (a c)
2
4b 22
We can easily realize that the prot di¤erence for  = 0:5 is smaller than
the di¤erence for two rm case. Four rm case prot di¤erence is similarly
smaller than the three and two rm cases. Three rm case prot of the mo-
nopolist is higher than the monopoly case if 38b2   84 > 482b2: We see
that as the number of rms increases possibility of competition being better
than monopoly for the Monopolist decreases. This results are similar to the
results we obtained for motivations and quantities. With new rms Monop-
olists prot is shared and the positive spillover e¤ect is not high enough to
compensate this. New rms decreases the protability of theMonopolist, but
what happens to the welfare of the customers? We will answers this question
at next section. Change in the prot level for the Monopolist is given in
Figure 6 for di¤erent market structures.
2.4 Decreasing Motivational E¢ ciency
Up to this part, we have tried to see the e¤ects of competition on rms
and customers by examining two things: the spillover level and the number
of rms involved in competition. We have assumed that when the number
of rms increase, the conguration of the market stays still; meaning the
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Figure 6: Change in Pro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cost and motivation structure do not change. Now what we want to answer
at that part is, what if introduced competition changes the market in some
other ways near changing motivation level and market shares directly. For
example by changing motivational e¢ ciency. So in this part of the study, we
consider a decrease in the motivational e¢ ciency of the rms as the number
of rms increase. Lets try to explain this connecting with the nancial crisis.
It is known that after the crisis the weak rms will leave the market and the
rms that have managed to stay in the market will raise their market share
and they will become stronger. Hence these rms will have more power to
invest on education level of the employees to make them learn how to utilize
their motivations in a better way or, lets say as the rm was not very strong
(there were too many rms in the market), they could not hire well educated
employees or they could not spent too much money to increase the work
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based education level of the employees. So even if the company increases the
motivation of the employees, say fromm to m0; the utility they get from this
is smaller then the case of this rm being stronger with the same motivation
increase (from m to m0). In our case when the competition in the market
increases by the increasing number of rms then each rm has less market
share and hence they have less control on their motivations. We have dened
the motivational e¢ ciency parameter as :So in this part we assume a change
in  as number of rms increase. Assuming the real structure of the economy
is as given in this part, we will be also trying to answer the question of what
will happen to the prices after the crisis.
Similar to the previous cases, the prot functions will be given as follows
except this time the motivation e¢ ciency is given as 
n
, and it is dependent
to the number of rms in the market.
i = ((a   b  (q1 + q2 + q3 + ::: + qn))   (c   n(m1 + m2 + m3 + ::: +
mn)))  qi     m
2
i
2
Under this new assumption, the results for one, two, three and four rm
cases have been obtained (See Table 1). Since for this part we are mostly
interested in the changes at the market as a whole, now instead of the rm
level prots or rm based quantities, we analyze the changes in motivations
and total quantity sold. So that we can tell what will happen to the prices
with new entrants to the market. That might be interesting because now
the e¢ ciency of motivation, hence the importance of motivation decreases.
One may expect the rms to run less motivated and they may produce less
and the prices will increase, but it is also possible to say that the free riding
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problem will be solved and the rms will become more motivated to produce
more. Now let see how this assumption really changes the motivation and
total quantity levels.
In Table 2, the conditions for two, three and four rm case motivations
to be higher or lower than the monopoly case has been given. Figure 7 also
summarizes these results. First interesting result that could also be seen from
Figure 7 is the negative changes obtained in motivations. The gure means,
rst of all when we move from monopolist market structure to the two, three
or four rm case market structure the motivations certainly becomes smaller,
but after we have two rm in the market, introducing an other rm increases
the motivations. In other words, when we move from one rm case to two
rm case, the market share of the Monopolist will decrease, hence this will
decrease the motivation. Addition to that now we have the decrease in mo-
tivational e¢ ciency which also decreases the motivation. This time with the
motivational e¢ ciency decrease, the free riding e¤ect also diminishes, hence
addition to losing some of the market to the second rm, the Monopolist
can not also utilize the competition enough. Therefore we have the result
that the motivation will be certainly smaller when new rms introduced to
a monopoly under this structure. Of course this does not mean being less
motivated will induce less sales of the goods, motivation is also costly and
less motivation may also force the rms to produce more under competi-
tion. That will be analyzed later. Now, although moving from one rm to
two rm case, decreases the motivation of the Monopolist; moving from two
rms case to three and then four rms cases starts to increase the moti-
vation of the Monopolist. The direct negative e¤ect of introducing a new
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Figure 7: Change in Motivations
rm to the monopoly because of the market share loss will be, lets say, 1
2
M:
M denoting the market, before the Monopolist had whole M. Now with two
rm case it has the half, which means the loss is half of the market. When
we move from two rm case to three rm case the loss becomes (1
2
M   1
3
M)
1
6
M . So introducing new rms becomes less costly for the Monopolist, plus
having new rms increases the opportunity to utilize competition more for
the Monopolist because of the spillover. So after two rm case, adding an
other one increases the motivation for the Monopolist.
An other important result, at that point, is obtained about the optimal
value of spillover. At section 2.3, we have shown that with no motivational
e¢ ciency decrease, the motivations started to go down for  > 0:5; because
of the excess free riding e¤ect (see Figure 4). Inversely, now even after
 = 0:5; the motivations increase. The decreasing motivational e¢ ciency,
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solves the free riding problem and rms want to have higher spillover to utilize
the competition. Now smaller free riding encourages rms to utilize others
motivation more and the peak point for the optimal motivations become
 = 1: If the decrease in e¢ ciency of motivations were to be slower when the
number of rms increase then some e¤ect of free riding would come back and
we would probably have a peak point at  about 0:8:
Now lets look at the changes in total quantities sold. Depending on the
analysis we made at part 2.3, we can draw the graph of the total quantities
sold at the market. Without the assumption of decreasing motivational ef-
ciency it is seen that two rm case is the best one for the customers (The
smaller the level of curve the better it is for this part because of the direction
of the inequality-See Table 3). As we see at Figure 5, if we move from two
rm case to the three rm case, the quantity produced decreases for each
rm. With no decreasing motivational e¢ ciency, one additional rm means
more free riding danger. This free riding problem plus the market share loss
with a new entrant, surpress the positive e¤ect of increased competition and
hence the motivations start to go down when we move from two rm case
to three or four rm cases. This has been shown at Figure 4. Similarly we
also showed at section 2.3 that because of this motivational decrease two rm
case Monopolists production is higher then the three rm cases (See Figure
5). Hence the total quantities for two rm case is higher than three rm case
and this is higher than the four rm case. Figure 8 summarizes this relation
for total number of productions. So without the motivational e¢ ciency as-
sumption, in a case of crisis we would conclude that after the crisis the prices
would fall down, because now we have less rms in the economy.
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But, when we assume decreasing motivational e¢ ciency when number of
rms increase, the picture becomes inverse. In Figure 9, the curve represent-
ing four rm case is the lowest one, meaning in four rm case total quantity
produced is higher then other cases. We have seen that with the motivational
e¢ ciency assumption, the motivations were highest for four rm case. The
second highest was the three rm case, Hence the total quantities produced
is parallel to the level of motivations as usual. An other interesting result is
the following; we have said that with decreasing motivational e¢ ciency, the
motivations become lower when we move from monopoly to two, three or
four rm cases (see Figure 7). For the total quantity of duopoly to be higher
than the monopoly the condition (
2(2+22 2)
3
< b) should hold if there is
no decreasing motivational e¢ ciency (see Table 3). This condition becomes
(
2(10+2 )
6
< b) when there is decreasing motivational e¢ ciency. From
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Figure 9: Change in Total Quantities With E¢ ciency Decrease
these two conditions and from Figure 9 and Figure 8, it can be seen that the
total quantity is higher when there is no decreasing motivational e¢ ciency
. This is true for three and four rm cases too. Hence if the motivational
e¢ ciency is dependent to the number of rms, then the customers become
worse o¤ when compared to the no decreasing e¢ ciency case. Considering
the crisis again, this time we say if the number of rms decrease after the
crisis, the prices become higher. An other point, the dependence of the quan-
tity produced to the spillover parameter decreases, since the curves become
smooth.
3. Conclusion
The known dynamics of the monopolistic market structure has been ana-
lyzed in a di¤erent way, under the intuition of the yardstick competition and
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the R&D investments. We tried to bring out that under some real market
assumptions, it can be shown that monopoly may not always give the best
solution even to the Monopolist. Some competition may make the rms to
run more e¢ ciently. After answering this question here comes the next one.
So if we say competition is even good for the Monopolist, do we mean that
the more competitive the market the better it is.
Hence the results will be summarized in two parts, rstly the e¤ects of
competition on monopolist rms and how does it e¤ect the results when the
monopolist is an exporter or not; and secondly to what level the competition
is good for the rms and for the market separately. The more the Monop-
olist is motivation e¢ cient (can reects its motivation to cost decreasing
processes) the more protable competition to this rm is. If motivation cost
decreases, and rms can use the motivation e¢ ciently, then the probabil-
ity (here probability means number of  values satisfying this condition) of
competition being better than monopoly for theMonopolist, becomes higher.
When we consider the will of the market, then we say too little or a lot of
motivation spillover is not good for welfare level. Low spillover level cannot
utilize the competition fully and hence the prices do not fall as expected.
Too much spillover decrease the will of the rms to be motivated which is
reected to the customers badly too. For the rms, as the spillover level is
high the prots get higher. When we apply the same analysis for an open
economy, we get even more positive results toward competition. So if the
monopolist is running in an open economy, there is more opportunity for it
to get benet if the motivations of the employees are increased. Hence we
say economy being open increases the protability of the competition for the
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Monopolist.
Increasing the number of rms involved in the competition, can expose
di¤erent results. First it is seen that competition starts to lose it benets. An
additional rm added to the market instead of increasing starts to decrease
the motivations, because the advantages it brings is smaller than the market
share loss made by the added rm, plus now the free rider problem will
increase. The parallel structure takes place as more rms are added, except
moving form three rms to four makes less loss than moving from two to
three. So the prot loss follows a decreasing returns to prot conguration.
And nally we try to answer the question of what if added new rms also
change other things in the market. So as the new rms are added, the
market share of the rms decrease so they now have less ability to utilize
their employeesmotivation, meaning they have less motivational e¢ ciency.
Decreased motivational e¢ ciency decrease the negative e¤ect of spillover, but
there is competition still in the market hence the rms need to be motivated,
which gives a better result for the market. At that part what we wanted to
nd was the e¤ect of competition to the market, and we have found that in a
case of motivational e¢ ciency loss, adding more rms to the market simply
decreases the prices more.
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Appendix
Table 1: Decreasing E¢ ciency Optimal Levels
Optimal Motivation Levels Optimal Quantities
Monopolist Case (a c)
( 2+2b)
(a c)
( 2+2b)
2 Firm Case 2(2 )(a c)
(18b+22 22 2)
6(a c)
(18b+22 22 2)
3 Firm Case 3(32)(a c)
(72b 32+422 42)
18( c+a)
(72b 32+422 42)
4 Firm Case 4(3 4)(a c)
(200b 92+922 42)
40(a c)
(200b 92+922 42)
Table 2: Comparison of Motivations for Decreasing Motivational E¢ -
ciency
2 rm motivation > monopolist motivation if 
2(3 2 2)
(10+4)
> b
3 rm motivation > monopolist motivation if 
2(10 42 6)
(54+12)
> b
4 rm motivation > monopolist motivation if 
2(21 92 12)
(168+24)
> b
Table 3: Comparison of Total Quantities
Decreasing E¢ ciency Non-Decreasing E¢ ciency
2 rm quantity > monopolist quantity if 
2(2+22 2)
3
< b 
2(10+2 )
6
< b
2 rm quantity > monopolist quantity if 
2(3+42 4)
4
< b 
2(51+42 4)
36
< b
2 rm quantity > monopolist quantity if 
2(12+182 18)
15
< b 
2(156+92 9)
120
< b
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APPENDIX A.1
2b  2 > 0 ==> 9b > 9
2
2
check 9b   22+ 222   42 > 0 => 9b > 22(1 + )(2  )
if 9
2
2 > 22(1 + )(2  ) => 9b   22+ 222   42 > 0
check for which values of ; 9
2
2 > 22(1 + )(2  ) holds;
9
2
> 2(1 +)(2 ) => 2  22  1
2
< 0; this is true for all values of :
Hence 9b   22+ 222   42 > 0
See the graph of f = 2  22   1
2
APPENDIX A.2
We need to check whether m(duopol)
m(monopol)
=
2(2 )(i(+1)+a A)
9b 22+222 42
(a A+i)
 2+2b
> 1
=> (2   )(i( + 1) + a   A) >   (a   A +   i) but for the sake of
simplicity lets assume, equality; so we will check the values of  where
2
9b 22+222 42
1
 2+2b
> 1 => 2( 2 + 2b) > 9b   22(1 + )(2   ) =>
2(2 + 2  22) > 5b
the values of  satisfying 2(2 + 2   22) > 5b will certainly support
2
9b 22+222 42
1
 2+2b
> 1:
But for the  values not satisfying this we can not say that monopoly
motivation is higher,
because we need to take the nominators into account too.
APPENDIX B.1
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b  2 > 0 ==> 9b > 92
check 9b   42+ 422   82 > 0 => 9b > 42(1 + )(2  )
if 92 > 42(1 + )(2  ) => 9b   42(1 + )(2  ) > 0
check for which values of ; 92 > 42(1 + )(2   ) holds; 9 > 4(1 +
)(2  ) =>   2   1 < 0; this is true for all values of :
Hence 9b   22+ 222   42 > 0
See the graph of f =   2   1
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